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PROBLEMS OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
CAP-AND-TRADE SCHEMES
Jason Scott Johnston*
The flexibility and efficiency of domestic cap-and-trade schemes for
conventional pollutants is often taken to imply quite directly that an interna-
tional cap-and-trade regime for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions can be
designed that will also realize comparable efficiency benefits.1  Moreover,
advocates of international GHG cap-and-trade regimes tend to believe that
such regimes can also be used to simultaneously pursue the global warming
equity objective2 of putting the cost of GHG reduction primarily on those
wealthy industrialized countries that have accounted for most of the anthro-
pogenic GHG emissions to date.3  Using the tools of economic analysis, this
Article argues to the contrary that international GHG cap-and-trade schemes
suffer from inherent problems of enforceability and verifiability that both
cause significant inefficiencies and create inevitable tradeoffs between eq-
uity and efficiency.
These tradeoffs arise because countries differ greatly both in their mar-
ginal cost of reducing GHG emissions and in the marginal benefit that they
can expect from such reductions.  In addition, while the cost of reducing
GHG emissions is quite certain, the benefits from such reduction are subject
to fundamental, non-quantifiable uncertainty.  The uncertainty of the bene-
fits from costly GHG reduction strengthens the argument in favor of having
relatively wealthy, developed countries bear most of the cost of GHG emis-
sion reduction.  Within an international GHG cap-and-trade regime, such a
distributive result can be achieved through an initial allocation of permits to
emit GHGs that favors relatively poor, developing countries.  Moreover, be-
cause such poor countries may be unable or politically unwilling to buy
GHG emission permits, an allocation of initial permits that favors such
countries may be necessary not only to further the redistributive goals but
also the efficiency of an international GHG cap-and-trade scheme.
This coincidence of equity and efficiency is, however, unlikely to be
realized under more realistic assumptions about enforcement and monitoring
in an international GHG cap-and-trade scheme.  Both economic theory and
evidence from the European Union’s emission trading scheme strongly sug-
gest that under an international cap-and-trade scheme, high-marginal-cost
* Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor, and Director, Program on Law, Environment and Econ-
omy, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am grateful to Cary Coglianese and Reimund
Schwarze for very helpful comments and suggestions.
1 See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY (2003).
2 For a representative statement of this conception of climate change equity or fairness,
see STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
45-47 (2008).
3 See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1. R
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GHG emission abaters will not face binding caps that are enforced against
them by their national governments.  The failure of such high-cost abaters to
participate in cap-and-trade schemes causes significant inefficiencies.  The
prospect of enlisting the participation of such high-abatement-cost, devel-
oped-world GHG emitters and restoring efficiencies by opening up trading
to include low-cost GHG abatement projects in the developing world is ap-
pealing, but ultimately doomed by the inability to verify that such develop-
ing world projects generate real GHG emission reductions.  Due to
inherently imperfect and limited verifiability, there is an inevitable tradeoff
between efficiency and equity: the broader the coverage of an international
GHG cap-and-trade scheme, the greater its potential to redistribute income
to people in poor countries, but the less likely it is to efficiently generate
reductions in GHG emissions.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Since both efficiency and equity in
international climate change policy depend upon the pattern of costs and
benefits from GHG emission reduction across countries, I begin in Part I by
setting out what climate change science and economics have discovered so
far about the regional costs and benefits of GHG emission reduction.  Part II
then traces some of the implications for climate change policy of the uncer-
tainty surrounding benefits from GHG emission reduction.  Part III then
turns to a more detailed analysis of the economics of an international GHG
cap-and-trade regime.  This Part focuses on problems that arise when realis-
tic account is taken of the incentives of countries to actually enforce GHG
emission caps against domestic GHG emitters and of the ability of interna-
tional institutions to credibly verify that developing world projects are gen-
erating real GHG emission reductions.
I. POSITIVE ANALYSIS: THE SIMPLE BUT UNCERTAIN COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEADERS AND LAGGARDS
Both the fairness and efficiency of any proposed international climate
change regime depends upon the geographic pattern of costs and benefits
that such a regime is expected to produce.  In this Part, I look to the recent
Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”) and recent work in climate change economics for recent and au-
thoritative projections of such costs and benefits.  What one learns from the
IPCC’s Reports is that the impact of climate change is currently believed to
depend not only on where a country or region is located on the globe, but
also — in a complex and relatively poorly understood way — on a country
or region’s wealth, income, and level of development.  Moreover, from the
climate change economics literature, one learns that the benefits of GHG
abatement, like the costs, are quite uncertain.
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A. Regional Climate Change Projections and Impacts
In its most recent Assessment Reports, the IPCC has, with increased
confidence, set out its projections not only for global mean temperature and
precipitation, but for regional impacts of climate change.4  The Reports gen-
erally suggest that the impact of global warming will vary greatly across
regions.  For example, during the present century, some parts of North
America (particularly Canada and the northeastern United States), as well as
a good deal of Russia, are expected to see both an increase in average tem-
perature, with warmer winters, and an increase in precipitation.5  Economists
who have looked at these sorts of projections have estimated that global
warming could bring countries such as Canada, Russia, and the United
States substantial benefits from increased agricultural productivity,6 while
the IPCC has concluded with “high confidence” that warming will generally
mean fewer deaths from cold.7
Other regions are not expected to enjoy such benefits from global
warming.  The IPCC’s latest Assessment Report on climate change science
sets out, with quite remarkable precision, a large number of projected re-
gional consequences from global warming.  The Fourth Assessment Report
states, for example, that it is “very likely” that Africa will experience
greater warming than will the Earth on average, and that rainfall is “likely”
4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSI-
CAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCI-
ENCE BASIS], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERA-
BILITY (Martin Parry, et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VUL-
NERABILITY], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
5 On North America, see IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 859, 890 R
fig.11.12; on Russia, see V.P. Meleshko et al., Anthropogenic Climate Change in Russia in the
21st Century: An Ensemble of Climate Model Projections, 29 RUSS. METEOROLOGY & HY-
DROLOGY 38, 40 (2004), available at http://www.ifaran.ru/~mokhov/MeleshkoEtAl2004_Mi
G4.eng.pdf (“Annual mean increase of precipitation over the entire territory of Russia dramati-
cally exceeds the [projected] global changes.”); IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra
note 4, at 875 fig.11.5, 883 fig.11.9. R
6 On the United States, see sources cited and discussed in Jason Scott Johnston, Climate
Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26-29, 33-36 (2008); on
agriculture in Canada and Russia, see William R. Cline, Global Warming and Agriculture, FIN.
& DEV., March 2008, at 23, 25 (finding that in a Ricardian equilibrium model of agriculture
and climate, warming generates no change in agricultural productivity in either Russia or Ca-
nada, but that when carbon fertilization effects are taken into account, averaged across the
Ricardian economic model and a crop-based model that does not incorporate equilibrium ad-
justment by farmers, Russia can expect a six percent increase in agricultural productivity,
while Canada can expect a twelve percent increase in agricultural productivity). Cf. Robert
Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries,
11 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 159 (2006) (finding that poor countries will suffer the bulk of dam-
ages from climate change in large part because of their location in the low latitudes where
temperatures are already high).
7 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 393 (cautioning, R
however, “that these will be outweighed by the negative effects of rising temperatures
worldwide”).
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to decrease in northern Africa, with a “greater likelihood” of decreasing
rainfall the closer one gets to the Mediterranean coast; that warming is
“likely” to be “well above” the mean in central Asia, with precipitation
“very likely” to increase in northern Asia and the Tibetan plateau and
“likely” to decrease in central Asia, while it is “very likely that heat waves/
hot spells in summer will be of longer duration, more intense and frequent in
East Asia”; and that it is “likely” precipitation will decrease in “most of
Central America.”8  As for small island states, the IPCC says that sea levels
are “likely” to rise on average during the twenty-first century “around the
small islands of the Caribbean Sea, Indian Ocean and northern and southern
Pacific Oceans,” with the rise “likely not [to] be geographically uniform
[though] large deviations among models make regional estimates across the
Caribbean, Indian Ocean and [North and South] Pacific Oceans uncertain.”9
Nevertheless, the models are good enough for the IPCC to conclude that:
Summer rainfall in the Caribbean is likely to decrease in the vicin-
ity of the Greater Antilles but changes elsewhere and in winter are
uncertain.  Annual rainfall is likely to increase in the northern In-
dian Ocean with increases likely in the vicinity of the Seychelles
in December, January and February, and in the vicinity of the
Maldives in June, July and August, while decreases are likely in
the vicinity of Mauritius in June, July and August.10
Though the popular media has reported that these projected regional
climate changes are likely to have a dire impact on people who live in
poorer, developing countries,11 the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report on the
impacts of climate change actually paints a much more nuanced and valua-
ble picture.  Consider, for example, Africa.  Regarding the impacts of pro-
jected climate change on Africa, the IPCC concludes that “[a]lthough future
climate change seems to be marginally important when compared to other
development issues, it is clear that climate change and variability, and asso-
ciated increased disaster risks, will seriously hamper future development.”12
At the same time, it is quite frank in admitting that:
The contribution of climate to food insecurity in Africa is still not
fully understood, particularly the role of other multiple stresses
that enhance impacts of droughts and floods and possible future
climate change.  While drought may affect production in some
years, climate variability alone does not explain the limits of food
production in Africa.13
8 IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 850 (emphasis omitted). R
9 Id. at 851 (emphasis omitted).
10 Id. (emphasis omitted).
11 See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Poorest Nations Will Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1.
12 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 457 (internal cita- R
tion omitted).
13 Id.
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Similarly, the IPCC Report’s chapter on climate change impacts for
Asia is even more cautious, concluding that:
Sustaining economic growth in the context of changing climate in
many Asian countries will require the pursuit of enhancing
preparedness and capabilities in terms of human, infrastructural,
financial and institutional dimensions with the aim in view of re-
ducing the impacts of climate change on the economy.  For in-
stance, in many developing countries, instituting financial reforms
could likely result in a more robust economy that is likely to be
less vulnerable to changing climate.  In countries with predomi-
nantly agrarian economies, climate change, particularly an in-
crease in temperature and reduction in precipitation, could, in the
absence of adequate irrigation and related infrastructural interven-
tions, dampen the economic growth by reducing agricultural
productivity.14
For small island states such as Tuvalu — which have become poster
children for the likely catastrophic consequences of global warming15 — the
IPCC Report notes that the diverse and resource rich coastlines of small
islands are “threatened by a combination of human pressures and climate
change and variability arising especially from sea-level rise, increases in sea
surface temperature, and possible increases in extreme weather events.”16
Still, the report cautions that “in the present assessment we can cite few
robust investigations of climate change impacts on small islands using more
recent scenarios and more precise projections.”17
Overall, in discussing the impact of projected global warming on devel-
oping countries, the IPCC is consistently careful to point out the difficulty of
isolating the impact of warming versus institutional and economic factors.
For example, although there seems to be a general belief that the world’s
poor people are most vulnerable to suffering harm from global warming,18
the evidence appears to be accumulating that traditional, low-technology ec-
onomic systems have much greater capabilities of adapting to changing cli-
mate than many Western observers suppose,19 and that even poor countries
14 Id. at 495 (internal citation omitted).
15 See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Tuvalu Is Drowning, SALON, Mar. 31, 2006, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/03/31/tuvalu/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
16 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 697. R
17 Id. at 711.
18 See, e.g., Ramus Heltberg et al., Addressing Human Vulnerability to Climate Change:
Toward a “No-Regrets” Approach, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 89, 90 (2009); Mendelsohn et
al., supra note 6. R
19 Perhaps the most dramatic and apparently unexpected example of the resilience of tradi-
tional economic systems comes from the Sahelian region in Africa, where satellite images
confirm that over the last thirty years, through changes in farming and husbandry practices, at
least 7.4 million acres have been reforested in Niger. See Lydia Polgreen, In Niger, Trees and
Crops Turn Back the Desert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at A1; see also Fabiano Toni &
Evandro Holanda Jr., The Effects of Land Tenure on Vulnerability to Droughts in Northeastern
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with extremely hazardous geographic locations, such as Bangladesh, have
greatly increased their ability to cope with natural disasters such as
hurricanes.20
It seems fanciful to think that any kind of meaningful dollar figure
could be attached to the potential losses that might be suffered by poor and
developing countries due to global warming.  Moreover, while the IPCC Re-
ports express a great deal of confidence in their projection that global mean
temperature will increase during the century, the vector of temperature/pre-
cipitation/sea level changes projected by the IPCC varies widely from one
region to another, even over a given continent, and these projections vary
tremendously across different general circulation climate models.21
Hence from the point of view of individual countries, the current state
of knowledge about likely twenty-first century global warming seems to
carry two somewhat conflicting messages.  On the one hand, different re-
gions and countries vary greatly in what they stand to lose from global
warming — with some actually potentially being better off, rather than
worse off, with the projected warmer and (globally) wetter climate.  At the
same time, there is substantial uncertainty about how much, if at all, differ-
ent countries would benefit from present-day reductions in GHG emissions
that would moderate future warming.
B. Costs, Benefits, and Climate Change Bargaining
In thinking about international cooperation to reduce GHG emissions,
the first and most important thing to realize is that the benefits from such
costly action are both regionally disparate and highly uncertain.  The costs to
different nations of reducing GHG emissions is much more certain and pre-
dictable, being largely a function of factors that are well known — such as
the extent to which a country currently relies on fossil fuels for its energy
supply, the size of the country and its population density, the mix between
mass transit and personal automobile transportation, and its current climate
(which determines the demand for wintertime heating and summertime air
conditioning).22
What we know now about the likely national costs and benefits of GHG
emission reduction provides a direct explanation for why some countries
Brazil, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 575 (2008) (presenting evidence that traditional farming
systems are not necessarily more vulnerable to drought).
20 Mohammed Fazlul Karim & Nobuo Mimura, Impacts of Climate Change and Sea-level
Rise on Cyclonic Storm Surge Floods in Bangladesh, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 490 (2008).
21 See, e.g., IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 869 (discussing projec- R
tions for the Sahelian region of Africa and noting that “[i]ndividual models generate large, but
disparate, responses in the Sahel”).
22 See, e.g., Andrew J. Leach, The Welfare Implications of Climate Change Policy, 57 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 151, 152 (2009) (discussing how the benefits of climate change poli-
cies are much more uncertain than the costs); Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael
Finus, Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements, 9 J. APPLIED ECON.
19, 26 fig.1 (2006) (showing how benefits of climate change cap-and-trade regimes vary
widely across countries).
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have been leaders and other laggards in international efforts to reduce GHG
emissions.  Consider, for example, the European countries that have been the
leaders in pushing for GHG emission reductions virtually from the instant
that climate change became an international issue.  By the 1980s, Japan and
many European countries had made large investments in alternative energy
technologies in response to the oil crises of the 1970s, were fossil fuel im-
porters rather than exporters, and wanted to protect their investments in al-
ternative energy.23  By the time of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, changes that
had nothing to do with environmental policy had made it relatively cheap for
Germany and Britain to commit to large reductions relative to the 1990 base
year: Germany was shutting down highly inefficient East German factories,
and Britain was well on the way to substituting North Sea natural gas for
coal in its power plants.24  By 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, it
was widely anticipated that decreases in GHG emissions from Britain and
Germany would lead to a ten percent reduction in European emissions by
2005 regardless of what the other member states did.25  As for France, due to
the fact that almost eighty percent of the country’s electricity is generated by
nuclear power, with twelve percent from hydroelectric power, its GHG
emissions are less than half of those of Germany.26
Though not all of Europe will suffer from global warming,27 and there
is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding all benefit estimations, Europe is
expected on balance to realize very large benefits from curbing global warm-
ing.28  With relatively low marginal costs of reducing GHG emissions, Eu-
rope would seem potentially likely to realize a net gain from any
international agreement requiring further GHG emission reduction.29  The
United States and China are in far different positions, both from each other
23 Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, Global Climate Protection Policy: The Limits of Scientific
Advice, Part 2, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 185, 194 (1994).
24 See S. Fred Singer, The Kyoto Protocol: A Post-Mortem, 4 NEW ATLANTIS 66, 70
(2004); see also Charles D. Kolstad, The Simple Analytics of Greenhouse Gas Emission Inten-
sity Reduction Targets, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2231, 2232 (2005) (“Germany and the UK did very
well . . . in reducing the GHG intensity of [their economies during the 1990s], though the
absorption of East Germany made this somewhat easier for Germany and the introduction of
North Sea gas (and phase out of coal) made this easier for the UK.”).
25 Miranda A. Schreurs & Yves Tiberghien, Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining Euro-
pean Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2007, at
19, 33.
26 Id. at 39; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The
Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1675, 1689 tbl.3 (2008).
27 For example, the productivity and quality of northern European vineyards is expected to
increase. See Orley Ashenfelter & Karl Storchmann, Using a Hedonic Model of Solar Radia-
tion to Assess the Economic Effect of Climate Change: The Case of Mosel Valley Vineyards
17–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,380, 2006), available at http://
www.ssrn.com/abstract=921546.  Other agricultural impacts in Europe may be positive as
well. See Gianpiero Maracchi et al., Impacts of Present and Future Climate Variability on
Agriculture and Forestry in Temperate Regions: Europe, 70 CLIMATIC CHANGE 117, 131–32
(2005).
28 See Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note 22, at 26 fig.1. R
29 See id. at 26.
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and from Europe.  Both the United States and China have very low marginal
costs of reducing GHG emissions, while their benefits vary from relatively
high benefits for the United States to somewhat lower benefits for China.30
Hence, although Europe, the United States, and China have for some years
been the leading GHG emitting nations (or groups of nations) in the world,31
they face very different costs and benefits from GHG emission reduction.32
The less developed countries in the world fall into two categories with
respect to the costs and benefits of GHG emission reduction.  There are
those — such as India and Brazil — that have been rapidly industrializing
and, by virtue of such industrialization, have become relatively large GHG
emitters.  Just because these countries have been rapidly industrializing,
however, does not mean that they are similar when it comes to GHG abate-
ment: Brazil is expected to benefit modestly from GHG emission reduction
but is estimated to have extremely high marginal costs of GHG abatement
(rising very steeply into the thousands of dollars per ton), whereas India is
expected to reap larger benefits and also to have an extremely low marginal
cost of abatement.33  Secondly, there is the category of relatively undevel-
oped countries that are also relatively insignificant GHG emitters.34
The wide variation among countries with respect to both the national
costs of reducing GHG emissions and the — much more uncertain — bene-
fits from costly GHG reduction has a direct and immediate consequence for
the problem of designing institutions for international GHG emission reduc-
tion.  Viewed as a strategic game played out among nations,35 the GHG re-
duction dilemma is most decidedly not a relatively simple game in which the
obstacle is to figure out a means of getting countries to cooperate in provid-
ing a good that all benefit from — GHG emission reductions.  Instead, it is a
game with conflicting interests, in which only some countries are likely to
find that costly GHG emission reduction is in their narrow self-interest.
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, due to the enormous uncertainty
surrounding the benefits of GHG emission reduction, whether or not a par-
ticular country would find such emission reductions to be in its self-interest
30 See id. at 26 fig.1.
31 See Jay S. Gregg et al., China: Emissions Pattern of the World Leader in CO2 Emissions
from Fossil Fuel Consumption and Cement Production, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1
(2008); Maximillian Auffhammer & Richard T. Carson, Forecasting the Path of China’s CO2
Emissions Using Province-Level Information, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 229, 229-30
(2008).
32 The relatively large marginal benefits to the United States presented by Altamirano-
Cabrera and Finus, supra note 22, at 26 fig.1 are, it must be stressed, somewhat dated.  Recent
work discussed in Johnston, supra note 6, at 21-36, for example, suggest that the United States
might get very real agricultural, recreational, and health benefits from a moderately warmer
climate, thus suggesting that the benefits to the United States from cutting GHG emissions
may well be much smaller than Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus estimate.
33 On benefits and costs to Brazil and India, see Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note
22, at 26 fig.1, 27 fig.2.
34 See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1685 tbl.4 (presenting data indicating that all of Africa R
contributed only 3.4% of global CO2 emissions in 2004).
35 For a discussion of environmental treaty-making, including, but not limited to, GHG
treaties, see, for example, SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT (2003).
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depends upon a complex weighing of potential future effects from global
warming that cannot be captured in a simple cost-benefit calculus.  For ex-
ample, the United States is generally not expected to suffer much from mod-
erate global warming during this century.36  However, were GHG emissions
to lead to very large increases in temperatures after 2100, then the United
States would be at risk of suffering great harm.37  In the meantime, develop-
ing countries might be so adversely affected by global warming that even in
a narrow sense, the self-interest of the United States would be harmed (for
example, by large increases in the number of people attempting to illegally
immigrate to the United States).  Depending upon the perceived likelihood
and cost of such a short- to medium-term impact, and the likelihood and rate
used to discount the even longer-term direct effects on the United States
from very large temperature increases, the perceived benefits to current and
future generations of U.S. citizens from costly present-day GHG emission
reductions could vary by many orders of magnitude.
In a very real sense, however, the expected benefits cannot be meaning-
fully quantified, because the probabilities of very high temperature in-
creases, and truly catastrophic global warming, are simply not known.  This
has been elegantly demonstrated in a recent paper by Gerard Roe and Marcia
Baker.38  As climate scientists well know — but the media and popularizers
such as Al Gore rarely mention — the bulk of the warming predicted by
climate models to result from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 is caused not
by the direct effect of increasing CO2, but instead from positive feedback
mechanisms.39  The most quantitatively important of these is the water vapor
feedback mechanism: when lower tropospheric temperature increases, so too
does the equilibrium amount of water vapor held by the troposphere, and
water vapor is a much more powerful GHG than CO2.40  Roe and Baker
show that because numerical climate models assume that positive feedbacks
predominate, even if uncertainty regarding particular positive feedbacks is
reduced, climate models will still attach positive probability to very high
(larger than five degrees centigrade) global temperature increases.41  Hence,
given the structure of numerical climate models, no amount of knowledge
about particular positive feedback effects can ever reduce uncertainty suffi-
36 See sources cited and discussed in Johnston, supra note 6, 21-41. R
37 Consider just the impact on water resources in the western United States: one study
estimates that a five degree centigrade increase in temperature would increase withdrawals of
Colorado River basin water by so much that welfare would fall by $175 million (in 1994
dollars). See Brian Hurd et al., Economic Effects of Climate Change on U.S. Water Resources,
in THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 133, 160 tbl.6.5 (Rob-
ert Mendelsohn & James E. Neumann eds., 1999).
38 Gerard H. Roe & Marcia B. Baker, Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318
SCIENCE 629 (2007).
39 Id. at 630.
40 For a succinct explanation of the role of water vapor as a GHG and the water vapor
feedback effect, see JOSE P. PEIXOTO & ABRAHAM H. OORT, PHYSICS OF CLIMATE 30 (1992).
See also IPCC, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 4, at 632-35. R
41 Roe & Baker, supra note 38, at 631. R
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ciently, in the sense of allowing us to rule out potentially catastrophic global
warming.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND THE ERROR COST OF A GHG EMISSION STANDARD
The presence of such fundamental uncertainty on the benefits side of
GHG emission reduction analysis not only profoundly complicates the cal-
culation of national self-interest, but also fundamentally impacts the deter-
mination of what would constitute a fair and efficient international GHG
emission reduction goal.  Consider first the efficiency problem.  Efficiency
generally requires that we equate the marginal cost of emissions reduction to
its marginal benefit.  As argued above, from what climate change scientists
and economists tell us, it seems that the problem of GHG emission reduction
is one in which the marginal cost of GHG reduction is relatively certain and
well known, but the marginal benefit could be anywhere from relatively
small to almost incomprehensibly large.  The standard way that environmen-
tal economics deals with such a situation — certain marginal costs and un-
certain marginal benefits — presumes that society is risk-neutral, and
equates the expected marginal benefit of GHG emission reduction to the
marginal costs.  The various possible marginal benefit curves are averaged,
by multiplying each by the probability that it will be realized, and then this
average marginal benefit curve is compared to the marginal cost curve.  The
emissions reduction level that equates marginal cost with expected marginal
benefit is that which maximizes the expected net social benefit from emis-
sions reduction.42  From the standpoint of ex ante efficiency, this is the effi-
cient level of emissions reduction.
This efficient level of emissions reduction is depicted, in standard fash-
ion, in Figure 1.  In Figure 1, there are two possible realizations of the margi-
nal benefit curve, MBL and MBH, with the expected or average marginal
benefit curve given by MB.  The emissions level e* where this curve meets
the marginal cost curve, given by MC, is that which maximizes the net ex-
pected social benefit from emissions reduction.
As applied to the GHG emission reduction problem, a large marginal
benefit from emissions reduction means averting potentially catastrophic but
fundamentally uncertain consequences.  It may be argued that with respect
to such catastrophic consequences, global society, far from being risk-neu-
tral, is strongly risk-averse.  If this is so, the global social-welfare function
would attach much more weight to such catastrophic consequences.  This
would be true even if such consequences were remote, provided that society
did not discount such future benefits by too much.43  In Figure 1, such a shift
42 For a lucid explanation of the standard analysis, see CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ECONOMICS 183-88 (2000).
43 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007) is
perhaps the best known economic analysis that discounts by very little remote but significant
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FIGURE 1
away from simple expected-value calculation would cause the curve MB to
shift to the right, increasing the optimal level of emissions reduction e*.
However, as noted earlier, the potentially catastrophic, long-term con-
sequences of global warming follow from projections of very large tempera-
ture increases, but these projections themselves reflect fundamental
uncertainties about climate feedback mechanisms.  Larger potential marginal
benefits from GHG emission reductions — the curve MBH shifting further to
the right in Figure 1 — are also more uncertain, in that such very large
benefits of reducing the risk of catastrophic harm from global warming. See id. at 35 (arguing
that “if we treat the welfare of future generations on par with our own,” it is hard to see any
ethical justification for discounting future benefits).
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marginal benefits are due to very high temperature increases, and such tem-
perature increases are due to poorly understood, and fundamentally uncer-
tain, feedback effects.44
This uncertainty about marginal benefits is very important when con-
sidering the efficient level of GHG emission reduction and the potential
costs in choosing a GHG emissions standard or overall cap on emissions.
The downside of giving more weight to potentially catastrophic long-term
consequences in choosing an optimal level of emissions reduction e* is that
it increases e*, which increases the odds of error45 and spending too much
money on reducing GHG emissions.
Furthermore, as one can see by rotating the MC curve to the position of
the flatter curve MC’ in Figure 1, the flatter the marginal cost curve for GHG
emissions reductions — the more constant the cost — the larger the impact
of uncertainty regarding the marginal-benefit curve in determining the opti-
mal level of emissions reduction e*.  If we consider, for example, shifting
the curve MBH further to the right, the optimal level e* moves more and the
curve MC is flatter.  If these catastrophic consequences are not realized, so
that the actual marginal-benefit curve is given by MBL rather than by the
curve MBH (to which we have given so much weight in determining the
desired emissions reduction e*), then there can be a potentially enormous
social loss from over-weighing catastrophic consequences.  This loss is
equal to the area of the triangle ABC in Figure 1.
One implication of this result, stressed in the environmental economics
literature, is that when there is uncertainty about the marginal benefits of
emissions reduction and the marginal cost curve is flat (very elastic), an
emissions standard such as e* is likely to risk potentially large social loss
and to be dominated on efficiency grounds by an emissions tax or charge.46
If, for example, we set the tax equal to T* in Figure 1, then this would
determine the marginal private benefit of emissions reductions, causing pol-
luters to reduce emissions up until the point where the MC curve intersected
the horizontal line through T*, a point that obviously moves farther and far-
ther to the right the more we rotate the MC curve down.  In the context of
GHG emission reduction policy, this result suggests the likely superiority
(under the presumed conditions regarding the elasticity of the marginal cost
curve) of an emissions charge over a cap.  For present purposes, however,
44 Consider for example, cloud feedback.  Summarizing the enormous uncertainty sur-
rounding this particular feedback, Graeme L. Stephens, Cloud Feedbacks in the Climate Sys-
tem: A Critical Review, 18 J. CLIMATE 237, 246 (2005) says: “the diagnostic tools currently in
use by the climate community to study [cloud] feedback, at least as implemented, are prob-
lematic and immature and generally cannot be verified using observations.”
45 As shown by Roe & Baker, supra note 38, while positive, the probability of extremely R
high temperature increases from CO2 doubling becomes very small the higher the temperature
increase; hence when policy attaches weight to such very large, catastrophic temperature in-
creases, the probability that such increases are not realized, and that policy is ex post wrong,
increases.
46 For a graphical representation, see Kolstad, supra note 42, at 183-85 fig.10.4. R
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what I want to stress is that relatively low, flat marginal costs cut in two
ways for a GHG emissions cap: they lead to very aggressive targeted reduc-
tions when emphasis is given to the potentially catastrophic consequences of
global warming, but if those consequences do not eventuate, there will be an
enormous social loss, borne by whatever industries or countries have under-
taken the cost of emissions reduction.
As explained in Part III, from the standpoint of efficiency, we want
countries and/or industries with relatively low marginal costs of abating
GHG emissions to carry the bulk of the load in reducing world emissions.  If
aggressive emissions reductions targets are set because of concern over po-
tentially catastrophic, but highly uncertain, consequences, then it is these
low-marginal-cost countries and/or industrial sectors that will bear the error
cost.  In concrete terms error cost is opportunity cost: countries that have a
low marginal cost of abating GHG emissions, and therefore do most of the
abating in the economically optimal outcome, will be devoting resources to
reducing GHG emissions rather than to investments that more directly stim-
ulate economic growth or provide for other social goals.  If such countries
are already relatively wealthy, such as the United States, and can be said to
be in some sense responsible for the bulk of the emissions that have accumu-
lated in the atmosphere — as the United States undoubtedly can47 — then on
fairness grounds such an outcome may be judged acceptable.  Having the
cost of erroneously large and costly emissions reductions be borne by rela-
tively wealthy countries that, in some sense, caused the global warming
problem may seem relatively unobjectionable.
What would be objectionable on many conceptions of fairness is to
have these error costs be borne by the citizens of countries that happen to
have low marginal cost of reducing GHG emissions, but are not especially
wealthy, at least in terms of per capita income.  For example, if the bulk of
emissions reduction is to be accomplished by China — because it has a very
low marginal cost of abatement that remains low even for very large GHG
emission reductions — then China is being asked to sacrifice present income
and wealth, and to slow its economic growth rate, in order to benefit other
countries that are more at risk from global warming.  But for a developing
country such as China, erroneously spending too much on GHG emission
abatement today because of fears of a fundamentally uncertain future cli-
mate catastrophe might generate a much more certain present and future
economic catastrophe.  Cutting present-day Chinese wealth, income and
growth not only harms the present generation of Chinese, but means lower
wealth and well-being for future generations as well.  Without growth today
and the promise of increased future wealth and well-being that it offers,
Chinese society and polity may be dangerously destabilized.  The point is a
general one: if at least one of the fundamental equity concerns of climate
47 On relative carbon dioxide emissions, see Gregg et al., supra note 31, at 2 fig.1. See R
also Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1688 tbl.8. R
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change policy is with the well-being of future generations, then policies that
may cause developing country resources to be diverted away from education
and economic growth and toward GHG emission abatement may well harm
future generations by impairing their opportunities.
It may be objected that one of the virtues of an international GHG cap-
and-trade scheme is that by generously awarding emission allowances to
low-marginal-cost developing countries such as China, such a regime offers
the potential for such countries to actually gain on net from present-day ex-
penditures on GHG emission reduction.  As I show in more detail in the next
Part, however, while this is indeed true, there remain other serious obstacles
to achievement of cost-effective GHG reductions through such a scheme.
III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL
GHG CAP-AND-TRADE REGIMES
This Part begins by demonstrating a positive result that is central to
many proposed international GHG cap-and-trade regimes48: the ability to use
the allocation of international GHG emission permits as a way to achieve
both equity and efficiency in meeting the global emission reduction target.  I
then present some severe limitations on this happy result that do not seem to
be much discussed in the climate change policy literature.  First, the assump-
tions underlying the predicted efficiency gains from international cap-and-
trade regimes are quite unlikely to be met.  Furthermore, the use of alloca-
tions and allowances in such a regime to explicitly promote various concep-
tions of global equity are likely to cause even greater losses of efficiency.
A. Efficient International GHG Abatement Under a
Cap-and-Trade Scheme
As drawn, Figure 1 assumes that there is a single, known marginal
GHG emission reduction abatement cost curve.  In reality, marginal GHG
abatement costs are believed to differ greatly across countries.49  As noted
earlier, while Brazil’s marginal cost of abatement rises quickly to thousands
of dollars per ton, China’s remains below $100 per ton until its level of
abatement rises to hundreds of gigatons.50  From an economic point of view,
given any GHG emission reduction goal, such as e* in Figure 1, the objec-
tive is to meet that goal at the lowest possible cost.  With marginal costs
varying across countries, cost minimization requires equalizing the marginal
cost of abatement across countries.  The primary virtue of a cap-and-trade
system is that it simply sets a cap, and allows countries to determine how to
meet that cap, with one option being buying unused GHG emission al-
48 See, e.g., STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1, at 66. R
49 See Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note 22, at 29. R
50 See id. at 27 fig.2.
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lowances from countries whose emissions are below their allowance level.
Thus, under certain assumptions, the cap-and-trade system accomplishes the
goal of international marginal cost equalization.
Figure 2 depicts such a system in operation for a simple two-country
world.  At the global optimum, marginal costs are equalized and Countries 1
and 2 abate respectively at levels e1 and e2.  Because Country 1’s marginal
cost curve is so low relative to Country 2’s, the economic criterion of cost
minimization dictates that Country 1 carries the bulk of the load in GHG
emission reduction (that is, e1 >> e2).  Under a system of tradable al-
lowances in which countries can trade costlessly and face sufficient incen-
tives such that they always comply either by reducing their emissions or
buying allowances from other countries, we will reach the global optimum
(e1,e2) regardless of how the countries’ emissions are initially capped (that is,
how many allowances to emit are given to each country).  To see this, sup-
pose (without any loss of generality) that we started with the burden of emis-
sion reduction shared equally between the two countries.  In Figure 2, this is
depicted by the point E/2, where E is the total emission reduction that we are
seeking to achieve globally.  As can be seen from Figure 2, at point E/2,
Country 1 has much lower marginal costs of emission reduction than Coun-
try 2.  Were Country 1 to reduce its emissions beyond E/2, all the way to e1,
then it would free up an amount of emission allowances equal to (e1 - E/2)
that it could sell to Country 2.  Of course, for such a move to make eco-
nomic sense for Country 1, it would have to receive a price that is equal to
its marginal cost (which of course increases the more emissions are re-
duced).  But as can be seen from the Figure, Country 2 would be willing to
pay up to its saved marginal cost to buy allowances from Country 1 rather
than incur the marginal cost of abatement.  That is, by reducing only by the
amount e2 rather than E/2, Country 2 saves the entire cost given by the area
under its marginal cost curve between these two points.  Hence under a trad-
able permits regime, even if we start with each country given the goal of
reducing by E/2, through the incentives created by trading, we end up with
Country 1 doing the bulk of the abatement.
There are three fundamental assumptions underlying this scenario: 1)
that monitoring and enforcement institutions are such that both countries
find it in their self-interest to meet their emissions reduction obligation E/2,
either by reducing emissions or by buying allowances from the other coun-
try; 2) that emissions reductions are “real” relative to some relevant base-
line; and, 3) that Country 2 will be able to find the funds to pay Country 1 an
amount at least equal to Country 1’s marginal cost of “extra” abatement
(that is, the amount e1 - E/2).  As I now explain, in the context of interna-
tional GHG emissions trading, all three of these assumptions are
problematic.
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FIGURE 2
B. Harmonizing Efficiency and Equity in GHG Cap-and-Trade Schemes
Assume that our global emissions reduction goal E has come from a
global social welfare calculus, like that presented in Part II above, which
gives enormous weight to fundamentally uncertain but potentially cata-
strophic consequences of warming, and which therefore uses a very high
marginal benefit of GHG emission reduction curve like MBH.  What has just
been demonstrated is that under an international cap-and-trade regime, the
bulk of the very aggressive emissions reduction goal E will be borne by
Country 1.  Of course, in the emissions trading story, Country 1 only agrees
to such a high level of emissions reduction because it receives some pay-
ment from Country 2 equal to or greater than its marginal cost of additional
reduction.  Conversely, Country 2 decides to comply with its obligations by
buying unused allowances from Country 1.
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There is a problem, however, if Country 2 is a relatively poor country,
and it is unable or unwilling to pay the amount that is necessary to induce
Country 1 to carry the burden of GHG emission reduction.  Even if Country
2 could in some way find the funds (perhaps by borrowing from the World
Bank or some such international agency), and even if Country 2 would bene-
fit from GHG emission reduction, it might well have little self-interested
reason to use those funds for GHG emission reduction rather than some
other program — such as the provision of cleaner drinking water or im-
proved education — that is much more pressing and valuable given its cur-
rent state of economic development.51
With such a constraint on the ability of high-marginal-cost/low-margi-
nal-benefit countries to pay low-marginal-cost countries for GHG emission
reduction, the only way to induce low-marginal-cost countries to efficiently
abate their GHG emissions is to begin with radically unequal emissions re-
duction targets.  Consider, for example, a scheme in which Country 1 is
given no allowances to emit GHGs, so that Country 2 is allocated the full
targeted reduction E.  In this case, Country 2 would sell GHG emission allo-
cations in the amount of E - e2 to Country 1 at some price between the two
countries’ marginal costs in this region, and Country 2 would actually reduce
its emissions by the same amount (in order to be in compliance with a rule
requiring that actual emissions not exceed the number of net allowances held
after trade).  That is, to overcome the low willingness-to-pay on the part of
Country 2, we make use of the fact that GHG emission allowances are a
currency with only one use, and we give sufficient allowances to Country 2
so that it is no longer a buyer of permits from the low-abatement-cost coun-
try, but is instead a seller of permits to that country.
Given the cross-national configuration of marginal benefits and costs
from GHG emission reduction, the need to use GHG emission allowances in
this way — giving a relatively large number of allowances to poor countries
with high marginal costs of emission reduction — is far from fanciful.  Bra-
zil, for example, is precisely such a country.52  In such a scheme, the ability
to buy and sell permits does indeed lessen the relative burden borne by
richer, low-abatement-cost countries, in that they lessen their cost of compli-
ance by essentially purchasing low-cost GHG abatement in poor, high-mar-
ginal-abatement cost countries.
The existing economic work on national costs and benefits from GHG
emission reduction suggests that there is another important configuration of
national costs and benefits to consider before moving on.53  This is the case
of China and India, both of which have very low marginal costs of GHG
emission abatement but are also, at least in per capita terms, quite poor coun-
tries with other more pressing development priorities.  Both China and India
51 See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that “many and probably most” R
developing countries have limited resources and have more immediate and pressing priorities
than long-term climate protection).
52 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. R
53 See, e.g., Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note 22. R
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have been big proponents of international schemes that would allocate rights
to emit GHGs on an equal per capita basis (that is, schemes that take global
emissions and divide by world population and then give each country a total
number of permits to emit GHGs that is equal to the global per capita
amount multiplied by the country’s population).54  In terms of Figure 2, such
schemes can be conceptualized by assuming that Country 1, the low-margi-
nal-cost abater, is also a poor and very populous country that is given the
vast majority of emission rights.  Under such a scheme, we begin at a point
far to the left, where Country 1 has little obligation to reduce emissions and
Country 2 would be doing the bulk of the emissions reduction.  As can be
seen from Figure 2, at such a point, Country 1’s marginal cost of GHG emis-
sion reduction is much less than Country 2’s, and hence there would be gains
from trade from having Country 1 reduce its emissions and sell unused per-
mits to Country 2.  Such gains would exist until we once again reach the
point (e1,e2) where marginal costs are equal for the two countries.
Country 1 will presumably not agree to sell rights to Country 2 unless it
receives a price at least equal to its marginal cost of GHG abatement.  If
Country 2 is a wealthy, high-marginal-cost-of-abatement country such as Ja-
pan or Germany, then it is reasonable to suppose that Country 2 would in-
deed be willing to make such a payment.  The end result is that by giving
most of the rights to emit GHGs initially to Country 1, we can achieve both
efficiency and what can be deemed a fair sharing of the cost of GHG emis-
sion reduction: Country 1 has done the bulk of GHG emissions reduction, as
efficiency dictates, but Country 2 has paid for that reduction.
C. The Efficiency and Equity of Cap-and-Trade Regimes Depends upon
Enforcement and Monitoring That Are Unlikely in the
International GHG Context
Unfortunately, while quite standard in the climate change policy litera-
ture,55 the immediately preceding analysis almost surely vastly overstates
both the likely efficiency gains from an international cap-and-trade regime
and the ability to harmonize equity and efficiency through such a regime.
The analysis presumes that all countries, rich and poor, in fact have an in-
centive to comply with their international obligations by holding sufficient
allowances to cover their actual allowed emissions.  It also assumes that
emissions reductions are real — that there is some mechanism by which a
status quo emissions level can be determined and set and by which emis-
sions reductions relative to that baseline can be verified.  In the international
context, however, existing evidence suggests that neither assumption is
54 For further details on such per capita schemes, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51
(2009). See also Jeffrey Frankel, Formulas for Quantitative Emissions Targets, in ARCHITEC-
TURES FOR AGREEMENT 31, 40 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (noting that
advocacy of equal per capita emissions rights has “long been India’s position”).
55 See, e.g., STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1, at 59-75. R
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likely to hold,56 and economic theory shows that when these assumptions are
violated, the performance of a cap-and-trade regime is severely diminished
on both efficiency and equity grounds.
1. Imperfect and Nationally Variable Enforcement Shrinks the
Market and Leads to Trading Primarily Among Countries
or Entities with Low Marginal Costs of Abatement,
Dissipating Cost Savings from Cap-and-Trade
The incentive of any entity to spend money to abate GHG emissions or
to buy allowances hinges on the existence of a credible and sufficiently
stringent sanction for failure to meet agreed-upon emission caps.  Thus, the
key question for any international GHG emission reduction regime is
whether there are credible enforcement mechanisms.  If countries do not en-
force GHG emission caps domestically, then such caps can only be made
effective if there is some mechanism for other countries to either force do-
mestic enforcement or to enforce directly against entities controlling GHG
emission sources.  Mechanisms to force domestic enforcement are interstate
sanctions such as trade sanctions and the like.  Trade sanctions are not likely
to be credible against the most important laggard countries such as China,
and are of unclear effectiveness for poor countries with high emission costs.
Direct enforcement mechanisms require an international institution that has
the power to directly sanction polluting entities for failing to comply with
domestically or internationally imposed caps.  Such an entity does not exist.
It seems likely that many countries might view their optimal strategy as one
in which such caps are imposed by law — thus placating international de-
mands for GHG emission limits — but then simply not enforced — thereby
ensuring that their citizens do not bear any costs from apparent compliance
with international demands (or, more formally, treaty obligations).
A realistic view of varying national incentives to actually enforce a
GHG emissions cap-and-trade regime suggests that the efficiency gains from
an international GHG cap-and-trade regime are likely much lower than eco-
nomic models commonly suppose.  The best way to develop the intuition for
this result is to consider the opposite case, of tough uniform enforcement.
This case is exemplified by the acid rain (sulfur dioxide) trading program set
up under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.57  Title IV
allowed covered electric utilities to meet sulfur dioxide emissions caps by
buying allowances from other firms covered under the program,58 and econ-
omists now are quite certain that Title IV was effective in lowering sulfur
dioxide emissions in a cost-effective way, and that allowance trading was an
important part of this success.59  Moreover, Title IV has had a 100% compli-
56 See sources cited infra Part III.C.2.
57 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651a-o (1990).
58 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651b(b) (setting out the criteria for trades).
59 See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PRO-
GRAM 109-196, 253-296 (2000).
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ance rate: every firm covered has held the required number of allowances.60
Underlying this success were two features: a uniform sanction for non-com-
pliance that, at between $2000 and $3000 per ton, has always been far in
excess of the market price of sulfur dioxide emission allowances,61 and —
due to the continuous emissions monitoring requirement — a 100%
probability of being detected and assessed this steep fine if ever in non-
compliance.62  Because monitoring and enforcement with very high fines are
guaranteed under Title IV, all firms comply, and when all firms comply,
none pays fines.  Because the equilibrium for firms subject to Title IV is to
comply — and incur their marginal compliance cost — the equilibrium price
of sulfur dioxide permits is determined by present (and expected future)
compliance costs.  That is, it is because of the enforcement institutions that
underlie Title IV and which effectively rule out non-compliance that the
equilibrium price of Title IV sulfur dioxide emission permits is based on
marginal compliance costs, allowing the tradable permits market to realize
the kinds of efficiency depicted in Figure 2 above.
However, under an international GHG cap-and-trade system, there is no
uniform sanction.  Rather, one would expect that the effective sanction for
violations will vary across countries.  Firms in countries with the weakest
sanctions for non-compliance will not comply with the cap-and-trade re-
quirement that their emissions not exceed the number of allowances they
hold.  Therefore, it can be presumed that at least some countries that are not
themselves subject to effective international sanctions for failing to meet
their national obligation to reduce emissions will end up in violation because
they do not have the political wherewithal to enforce domestic GHG emis-
sion standards against their own GHG emitting industrial sectors.  Their
willingness-to-pay for emissions allowances will be determined in equilib-
rium not by their marginal cost of abatement, but rather by the very low
expected sanction that they face.  In a system with uniform sanctions, enti-
ties with high marginal costs of GHG emission reduction would be the high-
est-value potential offset buyers and make up a crucial part of the market.  If
such high-marginal-cost reducers are located in countries with very weak
sanctions for non-compliance, they will have very low willingness-to-pay
for offsets, will drop out of the market, and violate their caps unless the
offset price is set at a trivially low level.
One might well expect to find a negative correlation between the aver-
age marginal GHG emission reduction cost of entities in a country and the
stringency of the sanctions that the country imposes on entities that fail to
comply with an internationally imposed cap.  In general, a higher marginal
60 Id. at 109.
61 See EPA, EPA-430-R-06-015, ACID RAIN PROGRAM: 2005 PROGRESS REPORT 7 (2006)
(noting that the penalty for non-compliance set a $2000 penalty that went into effect in 1990
but has been adjusted annually for inflation).
62 See Joseph A. Kruger et al., A Tale of Two Revolutions: Administration of the SO2 Trad-
ing Program, in EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY’S NEW APPROACH 115, 117
(Richard F. Kosobud et al. eds., 2000).
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cost of regulatory compliance correlates with a higher optimal expenditure
by regulated entities to lobby for lowering the sanctions for violating the
edict.  For this reason, one would expect to find the lowest national sanctions
for violation of an international GHG cap in precisely those nations whose
regulated entities face the highest marginal cost of complying with the edict.
If such a relationship in fact holds, then it is likely that demand for offsets
under such a cap-and-trade regime will be determined not by regulated enti-
ties’ relative marginal cost of compliance, but rather by the relative strength
of domestic sanctions and enforcement.  In such an equilibrium, offsets may
well be purchased by entities with relatively low marginal costs but stringent
domestic enforcement, while entities with relatively high costs but weak do-
mestic enforcement stay out of the market.
The efficiency rationale for cap-and-trade regimes arises precisely be-
cause such regimes give an incentive for low-marginal-cost abaters to do
most of the pollution abatement, freeing permits for sale to entities with
higher abatement costs (recall the earlier analysis using Figure 2).63  On the
argument here, it is very likely that under an international GHG emission
cap-and-trade regime that relies on national enforcement, the market may be
made up only of those firms located in countries that actually are serious
about compliance with their international obligations and actually enforce
domestic GHG emission laws against domestic GHG-generating firms.
Many high-marginal-cost emitters located in countries without credible en-
forcement will be missing from the international GHG emissions market.
This greatly shrinks the size of the GHG emissions market and, most impor-
tantly, limits the efficiency gains provided by such a market.  The interna-
tional GHG emissions market is likely to involve trades among countries (or
firms within countries) that have relatively low marginal costs, thus generat-
ing relatively modest cost savings.
The development to date of the European Union’s emissions-trading
scheme (“ETS”) strikingly confirms this theoretical prediction.  As ex-
plained by Niels Anger, the European ETS covers only energy-intensive sec-
tors that have relatively low marginal costs of GHG emissions abatement,
while excluding sectors such as transportation and households with higher
marginal costs.64  Similar structures — including energy-intensive industries
in the national cap-and-trade scheme, while leaving other high-marginal-cost
sectors out — have been proposed by Japan and Canada.65  Especially when,
as in Europe, such schemes are very generous in giving GHG emission per-
mits to covered sectors, they involve very large inefficiencies: the covered
sectors have so many permits that they have little need to reduce emissions,
while the higher-marginal-cost sectors that would be permit buyers are not
63 See discussion supra Part III.A.
64 Niels Anger, Emissions Trading Beyond Europe: Linking Schemes in a Post-Kyoto
World, 30 ENERGY ECON. 2028, 2035-36 (2008).
65 Id. at 2035.
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covered by the cap-and-trade regime at all.66  Both the exclusion of high-
marginal-cost emitters from the European ETS and the decision by partici-
pating countries to give the covered energy-intensive sectors large amounts
of emission permits are precisely what the previously discussed model of
differentiated national enforcement predicts.  Countries in the ETS have ex-
cluded precisely those high-marginal-cost sectors that would be permit buy-
ers but have used their political power to lobby against costly emissions
reduction requirements (and indeed, have lobbied with some success already
for emissions reduction subsidies).67  This leaves only low-marginal-cost
firms covered by the cap-and-trade regime; even there, gains from trade are
even less than I have presumed, because so many allowances have been
granted that firms do not need to reduce their emissions in order to comply.
2. The Inevitable Tradeoff Between Equity and Efficiency in
Defining Allowable Offsets
One possible solution to the loss of efficiency due to the exclusion of
high-marginal-abatement-cost sectors from regional GHG cap-and-trade
schemes has been to link such schemes across countries and regions.68  If
very low marginal-cost abaters from countries outside the region can be in-
cluded as possible trading partners, then high-marginal-cost abaters within
the region could comply with their obligations to reduce emissions by buy-
ing permits from the very low-marginal-cost abaters, thus making them will-
ing to become part of the regional cap-and-trade regime.  In the case of
Europe, it has been shown that compliance costs of the high-marginal-cost
sectors that are now excluded from the European ETS could fall by ninety
percent if firms and households in those sectors could buy allowances gener-
ated in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”) and in other industrialized countries under the Proto-
col’s Joint Implementation (“JI”) mechanism.69
66 Id. at 2035, app. A1 tbl.3, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2007.08.002;
see also Christoph Böhringer et al., Assessing Emission Regulation in Europe: An Interactive
Simulation Approach, 26 ENERGY J. 1 (2005).
67 See EURACTIV, EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (2009), http://www.euractiv.com/en/
climate-change/eu-emissions-trading-scheme/article-133629?_print (noting that the transport
and building sectors are excluded from the ETS) (last visited May 12, 2009) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review); DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, NEW ERA UNFOLDING FOR
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_
INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000239030.pdf (noting the very high abatement costs
for the German auto industry and the complex political compromises necessary to bring the
industry, eventually, into the ETS).  Marginal abatement costs in the German auto industry
have been estimated as ranging from 260-1530 Euro, almost ten times more than in the ETS
trading segment.  Ferdinand Dudenhöffer & Marcus Krüger, Kohlendioxid: Zu viele unter-
schiedliche Preise für den Autofahrer, 61 IFO SCHNELLDIENST 17 (2008).
68 Anger, supra note 64, at 2039-40.
69 Id. at 2039, 2046.  For a succinct summary of these and other key aspects of the Kyoto
Protocol, see Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Introduction: International Policy Architec-
ture for Global Climate Change, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT, supra note 54, at 1, 8-9.
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The problem with such proposals is that the ultimate objective of GHG
emission cap-and-trade schemes is not to simply reduce compliance costs,
but to minimize the cost of achieving a given targeted reduction in GHG
emissions — yet neither the JI nor CDM mechanism can credibly provide
real reductions in GHG emissions.
The defense of this assertion requires a brief discussion of the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM and JI mechanisms.  These are two of three types of “off-
sets” — credits for GHG emissions reduction — created by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.70  The most direct kind of offset under the Kyoto Protocol is the kind
described in Figure 2 above: emissions trading among the Annex 1, high-
GHG-emitting industrialized countries covered by Kyoto’s cap-and-trade re-
gime.  The other two Kyoto mechanisms expand the possibilities of trading
beyond the direct trades captured by Figure 2.  JI allows Annex 1 countries
to earn credit for cutting emissions in other Annex 1 countries; CDM gives
Annex 1 countries the chance to earn GHG offsets by investing in projects in
developing countries.71  In terms of my earlier analysis, the CDM process in
particular can be understood as a way to give project-specific allowances to
poor, low-marginal-cost countries that can be sold only if the GHG-reducing
projects are actually undertaken.
As envisioned by the designers of the European ETS, expanding the
potential trading set of a GHG emission cap-and-trade regime to include
both JI and CDM projects increases the number of low-marginal-cost abaters
located in poor countries that can be paid for their GHG abatement, thus
facilitating efficient, low-cost abatement and the redistribution of wealth and
income to the owners of such projects.  Unfortunately, recent work by
Michael Wara and David Victor shows that CDM projects are neither effec-
tively reducing GHG emissions nor redistributing income to the poorest
countries.72  As Wara and Victor report, the growth of the CDM market has
been spectacular, totaling 12 billion euros in 2007, a more than 200% in-
crease over 2006, with the EU’s ETS being the largest source of demand for
CDM projects.73  However, their investigation revealed that over the period
of rapid CDM market growth, 2004-2006, the vast majority of Certified
Emissions Reductions (“CERs”), the emission reduction credits generated
by CDM projects, came from flaring a gas (HFC-23) generated as a by-
product from the production of a gas used in air conditioners and plastics as
70 For an introduction and further background, see UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CON-
VENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE MECHANISMS UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: EMISSIONS
TRADING, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, http://
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited April 25, 2009) (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
71 Kathryn Harrison & Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, The Comparative Politics of Climate
Change, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2007, at 1, 3.
72 See Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon
Offsets (Stanford Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008), avail-
able at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf.
73 Id. at 9.
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a substitute for ozone-harming chlorofluorocarbons.74  This gas is an ex-
tremely powerful GHG — about 12,000 times more potent than CO2 — but
the market price of CDM credits generated by flaring this gas was so high
that it became more profitable to produce the refrigerant gas just to get the
byproduct for sale on the CDM market.75  In this way, the CDM market
created a perverse incentive to produce a potent GHG.76  According to Wara
and Victor, in the last two years, governments and the CDM Executive
Board — an essentially regulatory board that decides which projects qualify
to generate CDM credits that can be sold — have attempted to “clamp
down” on the HFC-23 credits, and they have succeeded, but only by shifting
the CDM market to the purchase and sale of credits generated by new hydro-
electric, wind, and natural-fired electricity generating facilities in China.77
Indeed, Wara and Victor find that “essentially all new hydro, wind and natu-
ral gas fired capacity is applying to claim credit for emissions reductions
under the CDM.”78  The problem with these projects is that many would be
undertaken without regard to the CDM: they are not generating real reduc-
tions in GHG emissions.79
What Wara and Victor have found to be true of the Kyoto CDM offset
market evidences a fundamental tradeoff in the design of an international
GHG emissions cap-and-trade market, a tradeoff that seriously damages the
ability to pursue both equity and efficiency through such a system.  The
tradeoff, simply put, is between enlarging the market and redistributing in-
come by increasing the number of GHGs and projects covered, and credibly
verifying that covered projects are really generating GHG emission reduc-
tions that would not otherwise have occurred.  The more GHGs and projects
are covered, the more difficult it is to ensure that GHG emission reductions
are “real,” and the greater the chance that the market for GHG emission
reduction credits is creating a perverse incentive for new projects that actu-
ally produce GHGs.
At the most basic level, this tradeoff reflects the enormous difficulty
and high transaction cost of monitoring and verification in the context of an
international GHG emissions cap-and-trade regime.  As argued previously,
the Title IV sulfur dioxide trading regime under the Clean Air Act is suc-
cessful because there is accurate monitoring of the actual sulfur dioxide
emissions from a particular entity and highly credible and serious sanctions
for non-compliance.  Accurate monitoring of actual emissions is just as im-
portant as the credibility of the sanction, not only to ensure that entities are
not incorrectly found to be in compliance, but also because accurate moni-
toring guarantees that when a company sells unused permits, it really is
74 Id. at 11.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 12-14.
78 Id. at 13.
79 Id. at 14.
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emitting less sulfur dioxide than permitted and therefore is being incen-
tivized to cut emissions.
With GHG emissions the story is very different.  There are a large num-
ber of GHGs, and many (like HFC-23) are much more potent than CO2.
There are also a huge number of widely varying types of sources of different
GHGs.  Unlike the Title IV experience — where one could be confident that
permits for sale really did reflect the lower marginal cost of real sulfur diox-
ide reductions by sellers — an international GHG-reduction cap-and-trade
scheme is likely to involve at least some sales with no real GHG emission
reduction by the seller.  Under Title IV, continuous emissions-monitoring
systems required by law provide extremely accurate plant-specific informa-
tion as to sulfur dioxide emission levels, and there is no room for regulated
entities to argue about whether they have reduced emissions of that pollutant
below the cap that applies to them.  Under an international GHG cap-and-
trade regime, however, countless projects arguably qualify as generating
credits for sale under the CDM mechanism, and the CDM Executive Board
must make an essentially regulatory determination of which projects count
as real reductions of GHG emissions and which do not.
The CDM Executive Board faces an insoluble dilemma.  On the one
hand, by narrowly defining what counts as a developing-world project gen-
erating CDM credits, it ensures that certified projects really do generate re-
ductions in GHG emissions, but it also cuts the number of credits generated
by such projects that can be sold to high-marginal-cost abaters in the devel-
oped world, and thereby lessens significantly the incentive for such high-
marginal-cost abaters to agree to participate in cap-and-trade schemes.80
Moreover, a narrow definition of certifiable CDM projects also means that
less income is transferred to developing countries, reducing their incentive to
participate in the global GHG-reduction system.  On the other hand, by more
generously granting CDM project status, the Executive Board effectively
uses the CDM mechanism to redistribute income to developing-world pro-
ject owners, and increases the incentive for high-marginal-cost abaters to
participate in a cap-and-trade system — but at the cost of approving many
projects that do not generate any real reduction in GHG emissions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Long advocated by economists, cap-and-trade regimes for pollution re-
duction have indeed led to cost-effective reductions in conventional pollu-
tants such as sulfur dioxide.  Because their efficiency is generally
independent of the initial allocation of permits across polluters, such regimes
may seem to be the preferred instrument for achieving both equity and effi-
ciency in reducing international GHG emissions. But just as is true of do-
80 Id. at 18 (recommending that the definition of CDM credits be tightened, with the
shortfall in developing country GHG emission reduction, and transfers, made up by direct
bilateral aid for new technological and infrastructure investments in the developing world).
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mestic cap-and-trade regimes for conventional pollutants, both the efficiency
and fairness of international GHG cap-and-trade regimes hinges on uniform
enforcement of caps and verifiable, real emission reductions.  Both theory
and the existing evidence suggest that in the case of international GHG
emissions, neither uniform enforcement nor emission reduction verification
is likely.  Without these preconditions, an international GHG emission re-
duction regime is likely to achieve only limited efficiency gains and to redis-
tribute wealth in a manner that may bear little relationship to the goal of
lessening the burden to poor people of reducing GHG emissions.  Other poli-
cies — targeted much more directly at encouraging both the development of
new, energy efficient technologies and their adoption in the developing
world — are necessary if the international goal of reducing GHG emissions
is to be achieved in a fair and efficient way.
